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Pyramidal Business Groups and 
Asymmetric Financial Frictions† 
By DUKSANG CHO* 
Given capital market imperfections, an entrepreneur can alleviate 
financial frictions by creating a pyramidal business group in which a 
parent firm offers its subsidiary firm internal finance. This endogenous 
creation of pyramidal business groups can beget asymmetric financial 
frictions between business-group firms and stand-alone firms. I build a 
model to show that these asymmetric financial frictions can have sizable 
effects on resource allocation. On one hand, the financial advantage of 
pyramidal business groups can foster productive firms by incorporating 
them as subsidiaries. On the other hand, the asymmetrically large 
amount of external capital controlled by pyramidal business groups can 
be expended by unproductive business-group firms and push up the 
equilibrium price of capital. The model suggests that with fine investor 
protection or low financial frictions, the benefits of pyramidal business 
groups can be dominated by their costs because the probability of 
fostering productive subsidiaries diminishes as the efficiency of external 
capital markets improves, while the prevalence of pyramidal business 
groups is not attenuated due to their continuing asymmetric financial 
advantage. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
pyramidal business group is a collection of legally independent corporations 
controlled by a coterie of shareholders. It is a common ownership structure for 
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a country’s largest firms, with exceptions of some countries such as the United States 
or the United Kingdom.1 The economy-wide repercussions of pyramidal business 
groups, however, have been unclear despite the fact that they are salient economic 
institutions too sizable to be ignored. For instance, pyramidal business groups in 
South Korea not only have been acclaimed as engines of growth for the country’s 
rapid development but also have been the subjects of controversy for their economic 
concentration.2 
In this paper, I build a model of pyramidal business groups in a general equilibrium 
framework and aim to answer the following question: Can pyramidal business 
groups affect the efficiency of an economy? I focus on a pyramidal ownership 
structure, which arises due to capital market imperfections and gives rise to 
asymmetric financial frictions between business-group firms and stand-alone firms.3 
Built on the 'span of control' model developed by Lucas (1978), two assumptions 
are made here. First, I assume that capital markets are imperfect, constraining a 
firm’s ability to raise external capital. A limited commitment problem is introduced 
such that an entrepreneur controlling his or her firms can divert τ fraction of the 
firms’ cash flow before outside investors are reimbursed. In the model, this realized 
diversion keeps the expected rate of return on external equity finance identical to the 
risk-free interest rate. An entrepreneur, thus, can earn positive profits as the private 
benefits of control and has an incentive to create firms to control with flotation costs.4 
Second, I allow for a business group as a private means that can alleviate financial 
frictions. In the model, a business group is constructed as a collection of two firms 
connected through a pyramidal ownership structure such that a business-group 
entrepreneur controls a parent firm that controls a subsidiary firm. There is no limited 
commitment problem between the parent and the subsidiary because both firms are 
controlled by the common entrepreneur. Thus, the parent can offer as much internal 
finance as possible to the subsidiary without financial frictions. Specifically, the 
financial advantage of a pyramidal business group in the model is twofold. Not only 
does the subsidiary use its internal equity finance offered by the parent as leverage 
to raise external capital, but also the parent uses its equity shares of the subsidiary as 
leverage to raise external capital. Thus, it is the financial advantage of a business 
group that makes it possible for an entrepreneur to build up a business group as a 
competitive ownership structure in equilibrium. 
An occupational choice model is used to examine the impacts of business groups 
 
1La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) examine 27 wealthy countries and show that most of the 
largest corporations in a country are business groups controlled by families or the state through pyramidal ownership 
schemes. La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) argue that the degree of investor protection is 
closely related to the corporate governance structure and that business groups are common in countries with poor 
investor protection. Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011) examine 28,635 listed firms in 45 countries, including 
developing economies, and reaffirm that pyramidal business groups are a common ownership structure around the 
world. They show that the prevalence of business groups is negatively associated with the capital availability of an 
economy, but insignificantly associated with the degree of investor protection. They argue that business groups 
emerge in order to alleviate financial frictions. 
2As of 2004 in South Korea, business groups controlled by a few families hold 56% of the market capitalization 
in the country according to Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011). 
3Given that a business group is a dominant ownership structure of the largest corporations in a country, this 
study revisits a question raised by many others: does the size distribution of firms in a country affect its economic 
efficiency? 
4Note that a common implementation of financial frictions in the literature hinges on an out-of-equilibrium path 
and that such a diversion does not occur in equilibrium (e.g. Buera, Kaboski, and Shin, 2011). 
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in a general equilibrium. I introduce an individual’s problem of occupational choices 
given heterogeneity in managerial talent and wealth throughout the population. 
Every period, each individual chooses his or her occupation from a worker, a stand-
alone entrepreneur, a business-group entrepreneur, or a manager who can be hired 
by a business-group entrepreneur. Given the degree of financial frictions capturing 
capital market imperfections, three types of capital markets are specified: external 
debt, external equity, and internal equity markets. These three types of capital 
markets are used to build up three types of firms: a private company, a publicly held 
corporation, and a pyramidal business group. This variety of firms’ ownership 
structures captures private institutions stemming from agents’ endogenous reactions 
against capital market imperfections, which generates asymmetric financial frictions 
among the firms in the model. 
The model shows that business groups can have a non-monotonic impact on 
resource allocation given the degree of financial frictions. In an economy with poor 
investor protection, the internal capital markets of business groups substitute for 
underdeveloped external capital markets and foster financially constrained but 
productive firms. A numerical example of the model shows that the rich become 
business-group entrepreneurs by hiring the poor but talented as business-group 
managers. It also shows that an economy with business groups accumulates a larger 
amount of capital stock than an economy without business groups because the rich 
save more in order to create business groups featuring internal capital markets. This 
implies that business groups can be efficient private institutions at the early stages 
of economic development, during which financial frictions are rampant. 
In an economy with fine investor protection, however, the asymmetric financial 
frictions between business group firms and stand-alone firms become a source of 
resource misallocation. The rich but unproductive choose to create business groups 
despite flotation costs because they can earn ex-ante positive profits by incorporating 
productive subsidiaries, while their ex-post profits can be negative because the 
probability of launching productive subsidiaries declines with the rising managerial 
compensation as investor protection improves. Moreover, business-group 
entrepreneurs use their financial advantage to consume more and save less by raising 
a larger amount of external capital without increasing net capital in production. Thus, 
the larger demand and the lower supply of capital push up the equilibrium price of 
capital and force stand-alone entrepreneurs, most of whom are financially 
constrained, to raise less external capital, produce less, and consume less. This 
numerical example shows that stand-alone entrepreneurs’ wealth drops significantly 
and that an economy dominated by business groups features decreasing levels of 
capital stock and stagnating aggregate consumption as the fraction of diversion τ 
goes to zero. 
An interesting lesson we can learn from the model is that the relative number of 
business-group firms in the numerical example does not decrease endogenously with 
the improvement of investor protection. This occurs because the incentive for an 
entrepreneur to build a business group in the model is not attenuated unless the 
asymmetric financial frictions between the business group and the stand-alone firms 
shrink. This result is consistent with Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011), who report an 
insignificant association between the prevalence of family business groups and the 
degree of investor protection. Given that the direction of effects business groups have 
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on an economy in the model is reversed as investor protection improves, the 
unvarying number of business-group firms implies that mitigating capital market 
imperfections will scarcely reduce factor misallocation or even worsen it without 
due consideration of pyramidal business groups, which could generate asymmetric 
financial frictions in equilibrium. 
Although I simplify the problem of business groups by focusing on the financial 
advantage of their internal capital markets, there is a larger pool of questions about 
business groups that should be examined, such as questions pertaining to 
monopolies, political economies, risk sharing, or the intangible assets of business 
groups. For example, Khanna and Yafeh (2007) review several issues of business 
groups and conclude that their origins and effects are largely unknown. Note that the 
objective of this paper is to narrow down the problem and understand a certain trait 
of business groups, their internal capital markets, in a general equilibrium framework. 
In the literature, the pyramidal ownership structure of a business group has been 
examined from two different viewpoints. First, a traditional view is that it is an 
expropriation device. The main argument of this view is that the pyramidal 
ownership structure creates a discrepancy between ownership and control. Although 
the controlling shareholder of a business group, typically a family, owns a small 
portion of the shares of business-group affiliates, its pyramidal scheme allows the 
family to take control over the business group and to earn the private benefits of 
control at the expense of other shareholders. This separation of ownership from 
control can generate agency problems, resource misallocation, and economic 
entrenchment. See Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) for a review of this perspective. 
Second, more recent studies examine pyramidal business groups as start-up 
breeders. They focus on the role of business groups that offer internal finance to 
start-up firms and help them grow larger by supplementing the inefficiency of 
external capital markets. Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006b) offer a theory of business 
groups based on the financial advantage of pyramidal business groups. In their 
model, the controlling shareholder of a parent firm uses the firm’s retained earnings 
to launch a subsidiary firm that provides cash flow to the controlling shareholder. 
Despite the discrepancy between ownership and control, business groups can be 
economically beneficial because subsidiary firms would be dismissed without the 
help of internal capital markets due to setup costs that cannot be raised from external 
capital markets given financial frictions. Bena and Ortiz-Molina (2013) use data 
from 38 European countries and show that business groups do play a significant role 
in creating new firms. 
These two perspectives on pyramidal business groups are not mutually exclusive. 
They are rather opposite sides of the same coin in that the first can cause the second. 
The opportunity to earn additional cash flow from a subsidiary firm is an incentive 
for the controlling shareholder of a parent firm, which offers internal finance and 
helps to launch its subsidiary firm. 
A natural question arises. Between these two viewpoints, which aspect of business 
groups is dominant? Simply put, are business groups good or bad for an economy? 
In spite of its relevance, the answer to this question has remained unclear, as most 
researchers have focused on the internal efficiency of an individual business group. 
Few researchers have developed models of business groups in a general equilibrium 
framework. 
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Among them, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006a) show that the financial advantage 
of business groups can cause asymmetric financial frictions between business-group 
firms and stand-alone firms, which result in factor misallocation in equilibrium. 
Despite its novel insight, their model is stylized, making it difficult when using it to 
capture the dynamic aspects of an economy allowing for forward-looking behaviors 
of individuals, such as savings or self-financing. This can be a problem if we want 
to examine the economic impact of asymmetric financial frictions because the wealth 
distribution of an economy is endogenously determined by the agents’ dynamic 
optimization, which may undo factor misallocation stemming from financial 
frictions (e.g., Moll, 2014). 
Ševčík (2015) examines the economic impact of business groups using a 
heterogeneous agent model with financial frictions in which the wealth distribution 
of an economy is endogenously determined. He studies the extent to which the 
internal capital markets of business groups can alleviate financial frictions and 
concludes that aggregate output in Canada would be reduced by 3% if its business 
groups were shut down. The business groups in his model, however, are partnerships 
rather than pyramids. This can be a problem if we want to examine the economic 
repercussions of pyramidal business groups that feature the separation of ownership 
from control. Specifically, in his model the degree of financial frictions captured by 
the ratio of capital to wealth is a given constant identical for all firms, while in the 
present model the ratio is endogenously determined and business-group 
entrepreneurs leverage their wealth into control over capital worth vastly more 
through a pyramidal ownership structure. 
In order to deal with these limitations, I introduce the following feature in my 
model. First, each individual chooses his or her consumption, savings, and 
occupation every period. Thus, the joint distribution of individuals’ wealth and 
occupations is endogenously determined. Second, an individual who chooses to be 
an entrepreneur also chooses his or her firms’ ownership structure. I connect 
corporate capital structures with corporate ownership structures given capital market 
imperfections. A pyramidal business group is introduced as a private means by which 
an entrepreneur alleviates financial frictions. Thus, asymmetric financial frictions 
among firms arise from the endogenous choice of the firms’ ownership structures. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I introduce an individual’s 
problem of occupational choice. In Section 3, given financial frictions, three types 
of capital markets and three types of firms are specified. In Section 4, a stationary 
equilibrium is defined by introducing a matching rule between a business-group 
entrepreneur and a manager. In Section 5, I remark on the model. The costs and benefits 
of pyramidal business groups are discussed. In Section 6, a numerical example of the 
model is constructed and the results of the model are presented. Lastly in Section 7, 
I discuss the limitations of the model and propose future research directions. 
 
II. A Heterogeneous Agent Model with Occupational Choices 
 
A. Economic Environment 
 
An economy consists of infinitely lived individuals. Every period, each individual 
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is endowed with an indivisible labor force and characterized by his or her own 
managerial talent z  that changes over periods following a Markov chain.5 Here, 
we assume that an individual consumes c  out of his or her own wealth a  such 
that [0, ]c a∈  and that a utility function ( )u c  satisfies standard conditions such 
that ( ) 0, ( ) 0,u c u c′ > ′′ <  and 
0
lim ( ) .
c
u c
→
′ = ∞  
Given ( , )z a , an individual chooses his or her next period occupation ( , )o z a  
from a worker ( )W  , a stand-alone entrepreneur ( )SA  , or a business-group 
entrepreneur ( )BG . At the beginning of the next period, a worker sells his or her 
indivisible labor force and earns wage w , and an entrepreneur runs a firm and earns 
from the firm’s stochastic cash flow π . 
An entrepreneur raises her firm’s capital k  given ( , )z a . At the beginning of the 
next period, the entrepreneur observes a shock to the managerial talent z′  and hires 
labor   given k .6 The firm then produces cash flow π , defined as the optimized 
gross output net of labor costs w  and capital depreciation kδ ′ , such that  
 
(1) ( , , ) max (1 ) , , 0, 1,z z k z k w k a aα θπ δ δ θ θ′ ′ | = ′ − + − ′ > + <

   
where 1a θ+ <   is a span of control shaping the production function into 
decreasing returns to scale. We assume that the capital depreciation rate (0, 1)δ ′∈  
is a random variable independent of z′ . 
A stand-alone entrepreneur can run either a private company or a publicly held 
corporation. A private company is a firm fully owned by its stand-alone entrepreneur, 
and it raises capital from external debt markets. A publicly held corporation can be 
incorporated by its stand-alone entrepreneur who pays flotation costs Fk . It can 
raise capital from external equity markets as well as external debt markets. 
A business group is defined as a collection of two corporations: a parent that offers 
internal equity finance and a subsidiary that receives internal equity finance. An 
individual of 1 1( , )z a  , 7  who chooses to be a business-group entrepreneur 
1 1( , ) ,o z a BG=  runs the parents with 1z  and hires a manager of 2 2( , )z a  who 
runs the subsidiary with 2z  . The business-group entrepreneur can choose 2z  , 
while 2a  is randomly drawn with a probability of 2 2( , )BGP z a  . The business-
group entrepreneur earns from the cash flow of both firms at the beginning of the 
next period. 
An individual of ( , )z a , who chooses to be a worker or a stand-alone entrepreneur  
 
5An exogenous process of managerial talent can be understood as a parsimonious means of capturing the impact 
of financial frictions on factor allocation by abstracting away from the endogenous nature of managerial talent. In 
Section 6, I will specify a state space and a transition probability of managerial talent z. 
6We can think of this timing structure, raising 𝑘 given 𝑧 and then producing cash flow 𝜋 after observing 𝑧ᇱ, 
as the risk an entrepreneur takes when making investment decisions. 
7I use (𝑧ଵ, 𝑎ଵ) instead of (𝑧, 𝑎) because (𝑧ଵ, 𝑎ଵ) is convenient for comparing a parent's managerial talent 𝑧ଵ 
indexed by 1 to a subsidiary's managerial talent 𝑧ଶ indexed by 2. 
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FIGURE 1. TIME-LINE OF AN INDIVIDUAL’S PROBLEM WITHIN A PERIOD 
 
( , ) { , },o z a W SA∈   can be matched to a business-group entrepreneur with a 
probability of ( , ).MP z a  If the matching is realized, the individual becomes a 
manager and earns managerial compensation ( , )Mw z a  at the beginning of the next 
period. Note that the managerial compensation Mw  is a function of ( , )z a , which 
is pinned down when the matching is realized despite the fact that the subsidiary 
firm’s production will be realized with z′  in the next period. 
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of an individual’s problem within a period. Given 
( , )z a , an individual initially chooses his or her occupation, after which the matching 
between business-group entrepreneurs and the others are realized. Finally, the output 
is produced with realized shocks to managerial talent z′  at the beginning of the 
next period. 
 
B. An Individual’s Problem 
 
Every period, each individual solves the following problem given his or her 
managerial talent z  and wealth a  such that 
 
(2)  
{ , , }
( , ) max { ( , ), ( , ), ( , )}W SA BG
o W SA BG
V z a V z a V z a V z a
∈
=  
given 2 2{ , , ( , ), ( , ), ( , )},M M BGr w w z a P z a P z a  which respectively stand for the 
rate of return on capital, the wage for a worker, managerial compensation, the 
probability of being matched with a business-group entrepreneur, and the probability 
of being matched with a manager featuring 2 2( , )z a . 
( , )WV z a  is the value if an individual chooses to be a worker such that 
 
(3)   0 0
0 [0, ]
( , ) (1 ( , )) ( , ) ( , ) max{ ( , ), ( , )},
( , ) max ( ) [ ( , (1 ) ) | ],
W M W M W M
W
zs a
V z a P z a V z a P z a V z a V z a
V z a u a s E V z w r s zβ
′
∈
= − ⋅ + ⋅
= − + ′ + +
 
where s  is the risk-free asset matured in the next period with interest rate r . 
( , )MV z a  is the value if an individual becomes a manager given ( , )Mw z a  such 
that 
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(4)   
[0, ]
( , ) max ( ) [ ( , ( , ) (1 ) ) | ].M Mzs aV z a u a s E V z w z a r s zβ ′∈= − + ′ + +  
Note that both the next-period wealth for a worker, (1 ) ,w r s+ +  and that for a 
manager, ( , ) (1 ) ,Mw z a r s+ +  are realized without uncertainty. 
( , )SAV z a  is the value if an individual chooses to be a stand-alone entrepreneur 
who runs a private company or a publicly held corporation such that 
 
(5)  0 0
0 z, ,
( , ) (1 ( , )) ( , ) ( , ) max{ ( , ), ( , )},
( , ) max ( ) [ ( , ) | , ( , , )],
C D E
SA M SA M SA M
SA C C D E
k k k
V z a P z a V z a P z a V z a V z a
V z a u a k E V z a z k k k kδβ ′, ′
= − ⋅ + ⋅
= − + ′ ′
 
where the firms’ capital in production k  is a function of private finance ,Ck  
external debt finance ,Dk  and external equity finance .Ek  The entrepreneur’s 
next-period wealth a′  is a function of shocks to managerial talent z′  and the 
capital depreciation rate δ ′  given { , , }C D Ek k k . 
Lastly, 1 1( , )BGV z a  is the value if an individual of 1 1( , )z a  chooses to be a 
business-group entrepreneur who controls a business group consisting of two 
corporations, a parent with 1 1( , )z k  and a subsidiary with 2 2( , )z k . The business-
group entrepreneur determines both firms’ capital amounts 1k  and 2k  by choosing 
{1,2}{ , , }C D Ei i i ik k k ∈   given 2 2 2{ , ( , )}.Mz w z a   1ck   is the private finance that the 
business-group entrepreneur offers to the parent, and 2ck   is the internal equity 
finance that the parent offers to the subsidiary. I will specify how the business-group 
entrepreneur optimizes 1k  and 2k  in the following section. For now, the focus is 
on how the business-group entrepreneur chooses 2z , the optimal managerial talent 
for the subsidiary, given 2 2( , )Mw z a  and 2 2( , )BGP z a  such that  
 
(6)  
2
2
2
1 2 1 2
{1, 2}
2 2 0 1 1
1 1
2 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 2
0 1 1 2 2 1 1 z z 1 1 1 2 1 2{ , , }
( , )
( , ) max{
(1 ) ( , )
( , ) max ,( , ), ( , | , )}
( , | , ) max ( ) [ ( , ) | , , , ].
C D E
i i i i
BG
a
BG
a
SA
BG
SA BGz
BG C
k k k
P z a
P z a V
V z a
V z a
z a V z a z a
V z a z a u a k E V z a z z k kδ δβ
∈
′, ′, ′, ′
⋅
 − ⋅ 
=  +  
= − + ′ ′
 
The business-group entrepreneur’s next-period wealth 1a ′  is a function of 
1 1 2 2( , , ,z zδ δ′ ′ ′ ′)  given the firms’ capital structure {1,2}{ , , }C D Ei i i ik k k ∈ . Note that the 
probability of matching with a manager 2 2( , )BGP z a  is endogenously determined 
in a stationary equilibrium and that its sum can be less than one such that 
2
2 2( , ) 1.BG
a
P z a ≤  If the demand of 2z  is higher than the supply of 2z  , some 
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FIGURE 2. OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE GIVEN MANAGERIAL TALENT z  AND WEALTH a  
 
business-group entrepreneurs would fail to be matched with their targeted managers 
featuring 2z . 
Figure 2 is an expository diagram of an individual’s occupational choice given his 
or her managerial talent z   and wealth a  . 8  First, it shows that the poor and 
untalented are likely to become workers because they are not productive enough to 
run firms and because they do not have enough wealth to hire managers. Secondly, 
it shows that the more talented one is, the more likely they are to become 
entrepreneurs. A declining line separating SA  from W  captures financial frictions 
with which would-be entrepreneurs could become workers if they do not have 
enough wealth. Lastly, it shows that the rich tend to become business-group 
entrepreneurs because they can pay managerial compensation and hire talented 
individuals as business-group managers running subsidiary firms. 
 
III. Financial Frictions and Three Types of Firms 
 
Suppose that an entrepreneur who controls her firm can divert τ  fraction of the 
firm’s cash flow. The tunneling ratio τ  captures the degree of financial frictions in 
an economy. Accordingly, (1 )τ−  captures the degree of investor protection in an 
economy because (1 )τ−  is the residual cash flow investors can enforce on a firm 
if the firm does not undertake reimbursements.9 
Given financial frictions, an entrepreneur can choose her firms’ ownership 
 
8Figure 2 is not the equilibrium output of the model. It is an example constructed to clarify the idea of an 
individual's occupational choice problem. 
9The fraction of diversion, τ, is a parsimonious modeling device capturing the economy-wide degree of financial 
frictions in order to focus on macroeconomic implications. Detailed practices from which financial frictions arise 
are abstracted in the model. Due to this lack of a microeconomic structure, the model is silent with regard to how an 
entrepreneur can divert her firm’s cash flow. Diversion in the model can therefore be interpreted as a wide variety 
of microeconomic limited commitment problems in the real world, such as agency costs during the managerial 
pursuit of private benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or tunneling practices of transferring resources (Johnson et al., 
2000). Thus, τ or (1-τ) is interchangeably labeled throughout this study, i.e., the degree of financial frictions, 
tunneling, investor protection, or the rule of law. 
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structure: a private company, a publicly held corporation, or a pyramidal business 
group. Specifically, an entrepreneur can run her private company, which is only 
allowed to access external debt markets with the help of the entrepreneur’s wealth as 
collateral. I assume that the external debt finance is bounded above by the firm’s 
lowest cash flow in order to guarantee its repayment. 
To raise more external finance, an entrepreneur can pay flotation costs and 
incorporate a publicly held corporation that can tap into external equity markets. I 
assume that an entrepreneur owns all shares of her firm at the onset of its 
incorporation, which can be sold to outside shareholders to raise external equity 
finance. The extent of external equity finance her firm can raise is assumed to be 
proportional to the firm’s expected cash flow and the fraction of shares sold to 
outside shareholders. 
Lastly, an entrepreneur can hire a manager with managerial compensation and 
build up a business group that consists of two corporations, a parent run by the 
entrepreneur and a subsidiary run by the manager. The business-group entrepreneur 
uses a pyramidal ownership structure to control both firms and makes the parent 
offer internal equity finance to the subsidiary without financial frictions. Similar to 
stand-alone corporations, both the parent and the subsidiary can sell their shares to 
outside shareholders and raise external equity finance. 
 
A. A Private Company 
 
Given her managerial talent and wealth, ( , )z a , an entrepreneur can run a private 
company that is a firm fully owned by her. Due to the lack of external equity finance, 
a private company relies on external debt finance. The firm’s capital in production 
k  is determined as follows. First, the entrepreneur of a private company is obliged 
for the company’s liability so that her wealth net of consumption a c−  becomes 
the firm’s collateral Ck  such that 
 
(7)        0.Ck a c= − ≥  
Second, given the collateral Ck  and the opportunity of diversion ,τπ  the firm’s 
capital in production k  is bounded above as follows. 
 
(8)  
,
Debt Repayment Collateral Secured Cash Flow to Debtholders
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) inf ( , , )C
z
r k r k z z k
δ
τ π δ
′ ′
+ ≤ + + − ′ ′ |  
 
Lastly, the entrepreneur of a private company can choose k  and decide how 
much external debt finance will be raised. I assume that the firm, or the entrepreneur, 
can invest in a risk-free asset by taking .Ck k<  Thus, the entrepreneur can earn a 
risk-free residual cash flow from the firm such that 
 
(9)       
,
(1 )( ) inf[ ( , , )].C
z
r k k z z k
δ
π δ
′ ′
+ − + ′ ′ |  
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To summarize, a stand-alone entrepreneur running a private company solves 
 
(10)  0 ,[0, ],( , ) max ( ) [ ( )| ]C
SA C
z
k a k
V z a u a k E V z a zδβ ′ ′
∈
= − + ′, ′  
subject to 
 
(11)        
,
( , | , ) (1 )( ),
1 inf[ ( , )].1
C
C
z
a z z k r k k
k k z z k
r δ
π δ
τ
π δ
′ ′
′ = ′ ′ + + −
−≤ + ′, ′ |
+
 
The entrepreneur of a private company can divert her firm’s cash flow. The total 
cash flow she earns, however, is the sum of the diverted cash flow and the residual 
cash flow after debt repayment, which is identical to the non-diverted cash flow after 
debt repayment. Unlike the publicly held corporations or business groups introduced 
in the following sections, we can therefore interpret that in equilibrium, diversion 
does not occur in a private company that is fully owned by its entrepreneur. 
 
B. A Publicly Held Corporation 
 
An entrepreneur of ( , )z a  can choose to incorporate her firm into a publicly held 
corporation with flotation costs 0.Fk >  After its incorporation, a publicly held 
corporation can tap into external equity markets. The corporation’s capital in 
production k   is determined by the sum of private finance Ck  , external debt 
finance Dk , and external equity finance Ek , net of flotation costs Fk  such that  
 
(12)      .C D E Fk k k k k= + + −  
Each type of capital is determined as follows. First, the entrepreneur can transfer 
a fraction of her wealth Ck   to her corporation. Ck   is determined by the 
entrepreneur’s wealth a  net of her consumption c  and private risk-free asset s . 
I assume that the flotation costs Fk  should be paid by the entrepreneur with Ck  
before the firm’s incorporation such that10 
 
(13)      .C Fk a c s k= − − ≥  
In contrast to a private company, the entrepreneur’s wealth cannot be used as 
collateral for her corporation because a publicly held corporation is a legal entity that 
 
10𝑘ி captures expenses such as underwriting fees, legal fees, or registration fees of issuing shares. Although in 
the real world flotation costs consist of fixed costs as well as costs proportional to the extent of shares issued, only 
the fixed costs are employed in the model with 𝑘ி. I exclude the proportional costs that can be paid with external 
financing after issuing shares because the efficiency of these back-loaded costs is scarcely distinguishable from the 
degree of financial frictions 𝜏. Moreover, in the model, 𝑘ி is paid every period if an entrepreneur runs a publicly 
held corporation successively. 
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is separate from its entrepreneur. According to this construction, however, the wealth 
transfers from its entrepreneur to the publicly held corporation work as collateral; 
this is why I abuse the notation of Ck . 
Second, a publicly held corporation can use external debt finance Dk . Given the 
assumption that an entrepreneur controlling her firm can divert τ fraction of the 
firm’s cash flow π  , the external debt finance Dk   is constrained in order to 
guarantee its repayment, as follows. Note that a publicly held corporation can invest 
in a risk-free asset by taking 0.Dk <  
 
(14)      
,
(1 ) (1 ) inf[ ( , | , )]D
z
r k z z k
δ
τ π δ
′ ′
+ ≤ − ′ ′  
Third, a publicly held corporation can tap into external equity markets. The 
corporation can raise external equity ( )E Ek k σ=   by selling its [0, ]SAσ σ∈  
fraction of shares. Suppose that (1 ) 0SAσ− >   fraction of the firm’s shares is 
required for an entrepreneur to take control of his or her stand-alone corporation. I 
assume that external capital markets are competitive and well diversified so that the 
publicly held corporation can raise external equity with the risk-free interest rate r . 
 
(15)    , Expected Payoff to Debt ReimbursementCash Flow after Tunneling
Outside Shareholders
(1 ) (1 ) ( , | , ) (1 ) ,
[0, ], 1
E D
z
SA SA
r k E z z k r k
δ
σ τ π δ
σ σ σ
′ ′
  + = ⋅ − ′ ′ − +  
∈ <
   
As can be observed in the above equation, the firm’s cash flow π  is sequentially 
distributed to the entrepreneur with tunneling τπ  , to creditors with debt 
reimbursement (1 ) ,Dr k+  and to shareholders with residual claims. 
To summarize, a stand-alone entrepreneur running a publicly held corporation solves 
 
(16)   0 ,0, , , [0, ]( , ) max ( ) [ ( )| ]C D SA
SA C
z
s k k
V z a u a s k E V z a zδ
σ σ
β
′ ′
≥ ∈
= − − + ′, ′  
subject to 
 
(17)  
,
,
(1 ) ( , | , ) (1 ){(1 ) ( , | , ) (1 ) }
[ , ]
1 inf[ ( , | , )]1
[(1 ) ( , | , ) (1 ) ].1
D
C D E F
C F
D
z
E D
z
a r s z z k z z k r k
k k k k k
k k a s
k z z k
r
k E z z k r k
r
δ
δ
τπ δ σ τ π δ
τ
π δ
σ
τ π δ
′ ′
′ ′
′ = + + ′ ′ + − − ′ ′ − +
= + + −
∈ −
−≤ ′ ′
+
= − ′ ′ − +
+
 
VOL. 41 NO. 3    Pyramidal Business Groups and Asymmetric Financial Frictions 13 
Condition 1. The Value function ( , )V z a  satisfies the following condition: 
 
(18)  , ,[ ( , ) { ( , | , ) ( , | , )}| , ] 0z a zE V z a E z z k z z k z kδ δ π δ π δ′ ′ ′ ′′ ′ ⋅ ′ ′ − ′ ′ >  
Condition 1 describes an entrepreneur running a firm who is averse to risk. Note 
that if the marginal value of wealth aV  monotonically decreases in wealth a  , 
Condition 1 holds. aV  , however, is not in general a monotonically decreasing 
function of a  . The individual’s value function ( , )V z a  may be locally convex 
even when its underlying utility function is concave because the individual’s choice 
set is non-convex. We need an additional structure to hold Condition 1. Henceforth, 
we assume that for all ( , ),z k  a minimum cash flow 
,
inf ( , | , )
z
z z k
δ
π δ
′ ′
′ ′  is low 
enough to satisfy Condition 1. Given that the marginal utility of consumption goes 
to infinity as consumption goes to zero, the marginal value of wealth ( , )aV z a′ ′  
with the sufficiently low minimum cash flow can be large enough to make the left-
hand side of equation (18) positive. 
 
Proposition 1. Given the risk-free investment opportunity for a corporation, 0,Dk <  
a standalone entrepreneur weakly prefers not to hold private assets such that 
 
0s = . 
 
Given Condition 1 and the risk-free investment opportunity, a stand-alone entrepreneur 
of a publicly held corporation strictly prefers fully external equity finance such that 
 
.SAσ σ=  
 
Proof. See Online Appendix B.11 
 
Corollary 1. From Proposition 1, the stand-alone entrepreneur’s choice variables 
degenerate into { , , }.C Dk k σ   Thus, we can simplify the problem of a private 
company and that of a publicly held corporation into the common problem of a stand-
alone entrepreneur such that 
 
(19)     0 ,, , {0, }( , ) max ( ) [ ( )| ]C D SA
SA C
z
k k
V z a u a k E V z a zδ
σ σ
β
′ ′
∈
= − + ′, ′  
subject to 
  
 
11For Online Appendix, refer to the KDI Journal of Economic Policy’s website (kdijep.org). 
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(20)  
,
,
( , | , ) (1 ){(1 ) ( , | , ) (1 ) }
1
[ 1 , ]
1 inf[ ( , | , )]1
1 [(1 ) ( , | , ) (1 ) ].1
SA
SA
SA
D
C D E F
C F
D
z
SAE D
z
a z z k z z k r k
k k k k k
k k a
k z z k
r
k E z z k r k
r
σ σ
σ σ
δ
σ σ
δ
τπ δ σ τ π δ
τ
π δ
σ
τ π δ
=
=
′ ′
=
′ ′
′ = ′ ′ + − − ′ ′ − +
= + + − ⋅
∈ ⋅
−≤ ′ ′
+
⋅
= − ′ ′ − +
+
 
C. A Business Group 
 
A business group is defined as a collection of two publicly held corporations, Firm 
1 and Firm 2, which are controlled by a business-group entrepreneur. Let 1z  denote 
the productivity of Firm 1 that inherits from the business-group entrepreneur and let 
2z  be the productivity of Firm 2 that inherits from the manager. 
We assume that a business group is connected through a pyramidal ownership 
structure such that Firm 2 is owned and controlled by Firm 1 that is owned and 
controlled by a business-group entrepreneur. More specifically, the business-group 
entrepreneur incorporates Firm 1 with private finance 2Ck , keeps at least (1 )BGσ−  
shares of Firm 2, and controls Firm 2. I assume that the manager of Firm 2 takes 
managerial compensation 2 2( , )Mw z a  relinquishes her control rights and cash flow 
rights over Firm 2, and hands them over to Firm 1. As a result, the entrepreneur of a 
business group can control both firms and divert cash flow from both firms. 
Two items here are important to note. First, the pair of managerial talent 2z  and 
its corresponding managerial compensation 2 2( , )Mw z a  can be understood as a 
contract between an entrepreneur buying 2z  and a manager selling 2z  with the 
price of 2 2( , )Mw z a . Thus, the manner in which 2 2( , )Mw z a  is pinned down can 
be critical in the model. Given the lack of managerial talent markets, I assume that 
2 2( , )Mw z a  is a certainty equivalent for an individual, who can run a stand-alone 
firm or become a worker as outside options. This will be formally specified in the 
following section. 
Second, I assume that (1 )BGσ−  fraction of shares is required to acquire control 
rights over a business group. BGσ  can differ from that of a stand-alone firm, SAσ , 
because (1 )BGσ−  needs to capture large enough block shares in order to ensure 
exclusive control rights over business-group firms, while (1 )SAσ−  only captures 
the stand-alone entrepreneur’s payoff structure proportional to the firm’s cash flow. 
Thus, I assume that BG SAσ σ≤ , although the model lacks a micro-foundation with 
regard to pinning down SAσ  and BGσ . 
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1. Capital Structure of Firm 2 
 
For now, suppose that Firm 2 is run by a manager who has 2z  and 2a . I assume 
that the flotation costs Fk  and the managerial compensation 2 2( , )M Mw w z a=  
should be paid by Firm 1 through internal equity finance 2Ck  such that 
 
(21)        2 .C F Mk k w≥ +  
This implies that Firm 2 should be incorporated before tapping into external 
capital markets. Firm 2 raises external debt finance 2Dk   under the following 
constraint given the assumption that the business-group entrepreneur, who controls 
Firm 1 that controls Firm 2, can expropriate cash flow from Firm 2. 
 
(22)        
2 2
2 2 2 2 2,
1 inf ( , | , )1
D
z
k z z k
r δ
τ
π δ
′ ′
−≤ ′ ′
+
 
Firm 2 raises external equity finance 2Ek  by selling its 2σ  fraction of shares. 
 
(23)  2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2, Expected Payoff to Cash Flow after Tunneling Debt Reimbursement
Outside Shareholders
2
(1 ) (1 ) ( , | , ) (1 ) ,E D
z
BG
r k E z z k r k
δ
σ τ π δ
σ σ
′ ′
  + = ⋅ − ′ ′ − +  
≤
    
From the equations above, the capital in production of Firm 2, 2k , is determined by 
the sum of internal equity finance 2Ck  , external debt finance 2Dk  , and external 
equity finance 2Ek  net of flotation costs Fk  and managerial compensation Mw
such that  
 
(24)   2 2 2 2 .C D E F Mk k k k k w= + + − −  
2. Capital Structure of Firm 1 
 
A business-group entrepreneur of 1 1( , )z a  can transfer her wealth 1Ck  to Firm 
1. I assume that both firms’ flotation costs and Firm 2’s managerial compensation 
should be paid by the entrepreneur with 1Ck  such that 
 
(25)     1 1
Flotation Costs Gross Flotation Costs    of Firm 1          of Firm 2
.C F F Mk a c s k k w= − − ≥ + +  
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This arises not only because the timing of incorporating both Firm 1 and Firm 2 is 
simultaneous in the model but also because the contract between the entrepreneur 
and the manager should be established before Firm 2 is incorporated. 
Given the capital structure of Firm 2, 2 2 2{ , , },C D Ek k k   and its cash flow, 
2 2 2 2( , | , ),z z kπ δ′ ′  Firm 1 raises external debt finance 1Dk  under the following 
constraint, 
 
1 1 1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 ) ( , , ,Dr k z zτ π δ δ+ ≤ − ∀ ′ ′ ′ ′),  
 
where 1π  is the gross cash flow from Firm 1, defined as 
 
*
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Gross Output Net of Labor Costs and Residual Claims of Firm 1 from Firm 2
   Capital Depreciation from Firm 1
2 2 2 2
( , , ) (1 ){(1 ) (1 ) },
( , | ,
C Dz z k k k r k
z z
π π δ σ τ π
π π δ
= ′ ′ | = − + − − − +
= ′ ′
 
2
Gross Output Net of Labor Costs and
   Capital Depreciation from Firm 2
)k
 
 
We can rewrite the above inequality such that 
 
(26) { }
1 1
2 2
*
1 1 1 1,
1
2 2 2 2 2 2,
inf [ ( , | , )]1 .1 (1 ) (1 ) inf [ ( , | , )] (1 )
z
D
D
z
z z k
k
r z z k r k
δ
δ
π δ
τ
σ τ π δ
′ ′
′ ′
 ′ ′
−  ≤  + + − − ′ ′ − +  
 
Conceptually, the internal equity finance 2Ck  used by Firm 2 should be raised from 
Firm 1’s retained earnings (e.g., Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006b). Given the 
limitation that firms are created and liquidated every period, however, I use Firm 1’s 
capital 1k  as a proxy for Firm 1’s retained earnings. Thus, the internal equity finance 
2
Ck  is raised out of 1k , and Firm 1’s capital in production becomes *1 1 2 0.Ck k k= − >  
Lastly, Firm 1 raises external equity finance 1Ek  by selling its 1σ  fraction of 
shares to outside shareholders such that 
 
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 1, , ,
  Expected Payoff to
Outside Shareholders
(1 ) [(1 ) (1 ) ], .E D BGz zr k E r kδ δσ τ π σ σ′ ′ ′ ′+ = ⋅ − − + ≤  
 
This equation can be rewritten as follows. 
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(27)  { }
1 1
2 2
*
1 1 1 1,
1
1 2 2 2 2 2 2,
1
(1 ) [ ( , | , )]
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) [ ( , | , )] (1 ) .1
(1 )
z
E D
z
D
E z z k
k E z z k r k
r
r k
δ
δ
τ π δ
σ
τ σ τ π δ
′ ′
′ ′
 − ′ ′  
= + − − − ′ ′ − + +  
− +  
 
From the equations above, the capital in production of Firm 1, *1 ,k  is determined 
by the sum of private finance 1 ,Ck  external debt finance 1 ,Dk  and external equity 
finance 1 ,Ek  net of flotation costs Fk  and internal equity finance 2Ck  such that 
 
(28)   
*
1 1 2
1 1 1 2 .
C
C D E F C
k k k
k k k k k
= −
= + + − −
 
3. A Business-Group Entrepreneur’s Problem 
 
Given 2 2( , )z a   and 2 2( , ),M Mw w z a=   a business-group entrepreneur of 
1 1( , )z a  solves the following problem, 
 
(29)  {1,2}
1 2 1 2
0 1 1 2 1 10
{ , , }
, , , 1 1 1 2
( , | , ) max ( )
[ ( , ) | , ],
C D E
i i i i
BG M C
s
k k k
z z
V z a z w u a s k
E V z a z zδ δβ
∈
≥
′ ′ ′ ′
= − −
+ ′ ′
 
subject to 
 
(30) 
*
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
*
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
(1 ) ( , , ) ( , | , )
(1 ){(1 ) ( , | , ) (1 ) }
(1 )(1 ){(1 ) ( , | , ) (1 ) },
Equation (21) - (28).
D
D
a r s z z k z z k
z z k r k
z z k r k
τπ δ τπ δ
σ τ π δ
σ σ τ σ τ π δ
′ = + + ′ ′ | + ′ ′
+ − − ′ ′ − +
+ − + − − ′ ′ − +
 
Condition 2. The value function 1 1( , )V z a  satisfies the following conditions: 
 
(31) 
1 1
{1,2}
2 2
{1,2}
*
. 1 1 1 1 *
( , ) 1 1 1 2 1 2*
1 1 1 1
*
. 2 2 2 2 *
( , ) 1 1 1 2 1*
2 2 2 2
( , | , )( , ) | , , , 0,
( , | , )
( , | , )( , ) | , , ,
( , | , )
i i i
i i i
z
z a
z
z a
E z z k
E V z z z k k
z z k
E z z k
E V z z z k k
z z k
δ
δ
δ
δ
π δ
δ
π δ
π δ
δ
π δ
∈
∈
′ ′
′ ′
′ ′
′ ′
  ′ ′ 
′ ′ ⋅ >   − ′ ′   
 ′ ′ 
′ ′ ⋅ 
− ′ ′   2
0.
 
>   
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Proposition 2. Given non-negative financial frictions 0τ >   and the risk-free 
investment opportunity of Firm 2 such that 2 0,Dk <  a business-group entrepreneur 
weakly prefers no private risk-free asset and a full external debt finance of Firm 1 
such that 
 
{ }
1 1
2 2
*
1 1 1 1,
1
2 2 2 2 2 2,
0,
inf [ ( , | , )]1 .1 (1 ) (1 ) inf [ ( , | , )] (1 )
z
D
D
z
s
z z k
k
r z z k r k
δ
δ
π δ
τ
σ τ π δ
′ ′
′ ′
=
 ′ ′
−  
=  + + − − ′ ′ − +  
 
 
Given Condition 2 and the risk-free investment opportunity of Firm 2, a business-
group entrepreneur strictly prefers full external equity finance of both firms such that 
 
1 2 .BGσ σ σ= =  
 
Proof. See Online Appendix C. 
 
Corollary 2. From Proposition 2, the business-group entrepreneur’s choice variables 
degenerate into 1 2 2{ , , }.C C Dk k k   Thus, we can rewrite the business-group 
entrepreneur’s problem as follows. 
 
(32)      1 2 2
1 2 1 2
0 1 1 2 1 1, ,
, , , 1 1 1 2
( , | , ) max ( )
[ ( , ) | , ]
C C D
BG M C
k k k
z z
V z a z w u a k
E V z a z zδ δβ ′ ′ ′ ′
= −
+ ′ ′
 
subject to 
 
2 2
1 1
1 1
1
2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2,
*
, 1 1 1 1
* *
1 1 2 1 1 1 1,
2
2
[2 , ],
[ , ],
1 inf [ ( , | , )],1
[ ( , | , )]
1 (1 ) inf [ ( , | , )]1
(1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1
C M
F
C F M
D
z
BG z
C F C
BG z
D
BG
B
k k w a
k k w k
k z z k
r
E z z k
k k k k z z k
r
r k
δ
δ
δ
τ
π δ
σ π δ
τ
σ π δ
σ
τ σ
′ ′
′ ′
′ ′
∈ +
∈ +
−≤ ′ ′
+
 ′ ′ 
−  
= − − + + − ′ ′ 
+   − − + 
− −
+
2 2
2 2
, 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2,
[ ( , | , )]) ,(1 ) inf [ ( , | , )]1
BG z
G
BG z
E z z k
z z kr
δ
δ
σ π δ
σ π δ
′ ′
′ ′
′ ′  
+ − ′ ′+     
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(33) 
2 2
1 1
2 2
2 2 2 , 2 2 2 2
*
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
* *
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1,
2 2 2 2,
1(1 ) [ ( , | , )],1
( , | , ) ( , | , )
( , | , ) inf [ ( , | , )]
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) inf [ ( , | , )
(1 )
C F M D
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z
BG z
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−
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D
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z z k
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τ π δ
σ σ τ σ
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− +   
− ′ ′ 
+ − + −  
− + 
 
Note that in Corollary 2, Firm 1’s capital in production *1k  decreases with 2Ck  
but increases with the cash flow of Firm 2, 2 2 2 2( , | , )z z kπ δ′ ′  on the right-hand 
side of *1k  . Given that 2 2 2 2( , | , )z z kπ δ′ ′   increases with 2k   and that 2k  
increases with 2Ck , we find that the financial advantage of a business group derives 
not only from no limited commitment problems such that 2 1Ck k<  but also from an 
increase in the cash flow from Firm 2 to Firm 1. 
 
IV. A Matching Rule and a Stationary Equilibrium 
  
A. A Matching Rule between Business-Group Entrepreneurs and Others 
 
To complete the model, we consider an ad-hoc matching rule. It is designed to 
mitigate the gap between the model and the real world. Although the model assumes 
one-period matching between a business-group entrepreneur and a manager by 
construction, in the real world the matching between a business-group entrepreneur 
of ( , )z a  and a subsidiary Firm 2 of 2z  is stable over time. 
First, we assume that managerial compensation 2 2( , )Mw z a   is equal to the 
certainty equivalent for a manager who has outside options such that 
 
(34)      2 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2( , | ( , )) max{ ( , ), ( , )}.M M W SAV z a w z a V z a V z a=  
This assumption implies that a business-group entrepreneur acquires all of the 
gains from building a business group and that the manager of Firm 2 will have less 
wealth in the next period than the expected wealth a stand-alone entrepreneur would 
have due to the risk-averse preference. 
Second, we assume that the business-group entrepreneur can choose 2z   but 
cannot choose 2a . A business-group entrepreneur and its manager of Firm 2 who 
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has 2a  are randomly matched given 2z . As a result, while an individual always 
accepts the offer of being a manger given the managerial compensation as a certainty 
equivalent, a business-group entrepreneur of ( , )z a  can turn down the opportunity 
of launching a subsidiary Firm 2 if the matched manager has too high 2a  that 
induces 2 2 2( , ) ( , | ),MMw z a w z a z>   where 2( , | )Mw z a z   is the largest 
managerial compensation a business-group entrepreneur of ( , )z a  can be better off 
such that  
 
(35)  2 0 2 0( , | ) sup{ 0 : ( , | , ) ( , | )}.M M BG M SA BGw z a z w V z a z w V z a σ σ= > ≥ ≤  
Lastly, assume that a business-group entrepreneur, who screens out 
2 2 2( , ) ( , | )M Mw z a w z a z>  and gives up the opportunity of launching a subsidiary 
Firm 2, should keep at least (1 )BGσ−  shares of Firm 1. This assumption begets a 
business group without Firm 2, which sells only BGσ  fraction of shares, not SAσ . 
Although the capital structures of a business group without Firm 2 is ex-post 
suboptimal, it is ex-ante optimal for a business-group entrepreneur who wants to 
launch Firm 2 with the possibility of being matched with 2 2 2( , ) ( , | )M Mw z a w z a z≤ . 
The possibility of no subsidiary Firm 2 can be understood as an opportunity cost for 
a business-group entrepreneur. Given the limitation of the model defining a business 
group as a collection of two corporations, a business group without Firm 2 can be 
understood as a business group with fewer pyramidal layers. 
 
B. A Stationary Equilibrium 
 
Given the matching rule, a stationary equilibrium consists of a stationary joint 
distribution of managerial talent and wealth ( , );F z a  the probability of being hired 
as a manager ( , )MP z a  and the probability of being matched with a manager 
2 2( , );BGP z a  prices 2 2{ , , ( , )};Mr w w z a  and individual policy functions such as (i) 
occupation ( , )o z a  for an individual, (ii) the private risk-free asset ( , )s z a  for a 
worker or a manager, (iii) private finance ( , ),Ck z a  external debt finance ( , ),Dk z a  
and external equity finance ( , )Ek z a   for a stand-alone entrepreneur, (iv) the 
optimal managerial talent for a subsidiary firm 2 ( , ),z z a   private finance 
1 2 2( , | , ),Ck z a z a   internal equity finance 2 2 2( , | , ),Ck z a z a   and external debt 
finance 2 2 2( , | , )Dk z a z a   for a business-group entrepreneur matched with 
2 2 2( , ) ( , | ),M Mw z a w z a z≤   and (v) private finance ( , )Ck z a   and external 
finance ( , )Dk z a   for a business-group entrepreneur matched with 
2 2 2( , ) ( , | )M Mw z a w z a z>  such that 
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1. Given the stationary joint distribution of managerial talent and wealth ( , ),F z a  
the probability of being hired as a manager ( , )MP z a  , the probability of being 
matched with a manager 2 2( , ),BGP z a   and prices 2 2{ , , ( , )},Mr w w z a   the 
individual policy functions solve the individual’s problem in Section 2.2; 
 
2. The joint distribution of managerial talent and wealth ( , )F z a  is stationary such 
that  
 
(36)    ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }, | , , | ,( , ) , ;z a z z z a z z a aF z a dF z aδ′ ≤ ′ ′ ′ ≤=        
3. The probability of a worker or a stand-alone entrepreneur being hired as a 
manager, 2 2( , ),MP z a  and the probability of a business-group entrepreneur being 
matched with a manager, 2 2( , ),BGP z a  satisfy the following condition: 
 
(37)     2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2( , ) { , }
( , ) { , }( , ) 2 2 2 2
( , ) ( , ) ( , | )
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ;
M M
M
o z a W SA
BG
o z a W SAo z a BG
z z a z w z a w z a z
P z a F z da
P z a da dF z a z
∈
∈=
= ≤
= ∀

   
4. Capital market and labor market clear. See Online Appendix A for a full description. 
 
V. Remarks on the Model 
  
A. Financial Advantage of Business Groups 
 
In order to gauge how well internal capital markets can alleviate exogenous 
financial frictions in the model, we consider how much private wealth of an 
entrepreneur is required to raise a fixed amount of capital in production given the 
ownership structure of firms. 
Suppose that a business group consists of two firms that replicate a stand-alone 
firm’s capital structure with identical managerial talent such that 
 
*
1 2 1 2, , .SA BGk k k z z z σ σ σ= = = = = =  
 
We now compare the required level of private finance for a stand-alone firm Ck  to 
that for a business group 1Ck  in order to raise *1 2k k k= = . For a stand-alone firm, 
the feasible capital in production k  is determined by the following equation. 
 
(38) 1 { ( , | , ) (1 ) inf ( , | , )}1
C Fk k k E z z k z z k
r
τ
σ π δ σ π δ−= − + ′ ′ + − ′ ′
+
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Similarly, the set of feasible capital in production for a business group, i.e., *1k  for 
Firm 1 and 2k  or Firm 2, is determined by the following equations. 
 
(39) 
* * *
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 { ( , | , ) (1 ) inf ( , | , )}1
(1 ) (1 ) { ( , | , ) inf ( , | , )},1
1 { ( , | , ) (1 ) inf ( , | , )}.1
C F C
C F M
k k k k E z z k z z k
r
E z z k z z k
r
k k k w E z z k z z k
r
τ
σ π δ σ π δ
τ σ σ
π δ π δ
τ
σ π δ σ π δ
−
= − − + ′ ′ + − ′ ′
+
− −
+ ′ ′ − ′ ′
+
−
= − − + ′ ′ + − ′ ′
+
 
By solving for the equations above with *1 2 ,k k k= =  
 
(40) 
2
1 2 2 2 2
(1 ) (1 )2 { ( , | , ) inf ( , | , )}1
2 (1 )(1 ) ,
C C M
C M E
k k w E z z k z z k
r
k w k
τ σ σ
π δ π δ
τ σ
− −
= + − ′ ′ − ′ ′
+
= + − − −
 
where Ek   is the feasible external equity finance that a stand-alone firm with 
managerial talent z  can raise given Ck . 
At this point, we can compare the effective degree of financial frictions between 
business-group firms and stand-alone firms. By fixing capital in production as 
*
1 2 ,k k k= =  we observe the ratio of capital in production to private finance for a 
stand-alone entrepreneur (SA) and for a business-group entrepreneur (BG) such that 
 
(41)    
*
1 2
1
, .SA BGC C
k kk
k k
λ λ += =  
The financial advantage of a business group can then be measured by the following 
ratio. 
 
(42)  *
1 2
1| 11 (1 )(1 )2
BG
M Ek k k
SA
C C
w k
k k
λ
λ
τ σ
= =
=  
+ − − −  
 
This ratio depends both on the cost of building up a subsidiary firm, ,Mw  and 
the efficiency of external capital markets, (1 )(1 ) .Ekτ σ− −  If the latter outweighs 
the former, the ratio becomes greater than 1. This implies that a business group raises 
more external finance than a stand-alone firm does given the same amount of private 
finance. For instance, suppose that 0.4
M
C
w
k
=  and 20
E
C
k
k
=  given 0.3τ =  and 
0.9.σ =  Then, the ratio becomes 2, meaning that a business group k raises twice 
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as much capital than a stand-alone firm does given the same amount of private 
finance. 
The asymmetric financial advantage of business groups can be lessened if business 
groups are subject to a lower fraction of equity shares sold to outside shareholders 
such that .BG SAσ σ<   With this condition, the above ratio can be rewritten as 
follows. 
 
(43)     1
11 2 1 (1 )(1 )2
M E
BG BG
BGC C
SA SA
w k
k k
σ σ
τ σ
σ σ
    
+ + − − − −        
 
Given the same specification as above but with 0.87BGσ =  and 0.9,SAσ =  
we can observe that the ratio becomes 1.01 and the asymmetric financial advantage 
of business groups is almost nullified. This teaches us that the minimum equity 
shares (1 )BGσ−  which the controlling shareholder of a business group should 
keep to control over the business group can have sizable effects on mitigating the 
asymmetric financial advantage of business groups. However, note that this example 
is devised for a stark comparison and that business-group entrepreneurs can choose 
2z  and optimize their external financing. Thus, we can guess that BGσ  should be 
much lower in order to lessen the asymmetric financial advantage of business groups 
in equilibrium. 
 
B. Asymmetric Financial Frictions 
 
Given the finite amount of capital stock in an economy, the asymmetric financial 
advantage of business groups is in other words the asymmetric financial frictions 
between business-group firms and stand-alone firms, which can result in factor 
misallocation in a general equilibrium. Note that managerial compensation Mw  is 
a certainty equivalent proportional to the firm’s expected cash flow net of risk 
premium while external equity finance Ek  can grow more rapidly than Mw  and 
that (1 )(1 ) Ekτ σ− −   can grow much more rapidly than Mw  . Thus, the 
improvement of investor protection captured by a declining τ  can increase the gap 
of external finance raised by business-group firms and stand-alone firms. 
The asymmetric financial frictions are of concern because it can be another source 
of factor misallocation. In equilibrium, alleviated financial frictions for business 
groups can increase the demand for external capital and push up the price of capital. 
For stand-alone firms, however, the higher price of capital r  acts as a higher degree 
of financial frictions τ  in that the financial constraints of external finance always 
come with 1/ (1 )r+  as well as (1 )τ− . Thus, given the lack of internal capital 
markets with the higher price of capital, stand-alone firms cannot raise as much 
capital as they could in an economy without business groups. As a result, an economy 
with business groups can give rise to a higher price of capital and lower aggregate 
output due to factor misallocation. Moreover, given that the asymmetric financial 
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frictions between business-group firms and stand-alone firms are intensified as the 
degree of financial frictions are mitigated, we can guess that the costs of business 
groups are more likely to dominate their benefits in equilibrium as financial frictions 
decrease. Last but not the least, the financial advantage of business groups increasing 
with investor protection (1 )τ−  implies that the prevalence of business groups 
needs not attenuate as investor protection improves. 
 
C. External Finance Substituting for Private Finance 
 
As the degree of financial frictions τ decreases, the model shows that both the 
volume of external equity finance Ek  and corporate savings, or corporate lending 
,Dk−  can expand without increasing capital in production k . Suppose that firms 
are financially unconstrained and that the degree of financial frictions is lessened 
such that 
 
(44)        *1 20, 0.d dk dk dkτ < = = =  
From Corollary 2, we find that a business-group entrepreneur can be better off by 
increasing consumption 0dc >  and decreasing both private finance 1 0Cdk <  and 
external debt finance 2 0Ddk <  without altering the next-period wealth 0da′ =  
such that  
 
(45)  *
1 2
1
20
*
1 2 1 2
,
| (1 )(1 ) 0,
(1 ) 0.
C
D
BGdk dk
C D
BG
dc dk
da d r dk
dk dk d dk dk
τ τ σ
τ τ σ
= =
= −
′ = − − + =
+ = − + + − =
 
Note that a decrease in private finance 1 0Cdk <  without a change in capital in 
production *1 2 0dk dk= =  means a larger amount of net external finance such that 
 
(46)       1 1 2 2( ) 0, ( ) 0.D E D Ed k k d k k+ > + >  
Moreover, from Corollary 2 with 2 0,dk =  we can observe that internal equity 
finance 2Ck  increases with corporate savings 2Dk−  such that  
 
(47)    2 2(1 ) 0.C DBGdk dkσ= − − >  
Similarly, from Corollary 1, a stand-alone entrepreneur can be better off by 
increasing consumption 0dc >  and decreasing both private finance 0Cdk <  and 
external debt finance 0Ddk <  without altering the next-period wealth 0da′ =  
such that  
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(48)    0
,
| (1 )(1 ) 0,
(1 ) 0.
C
D
dk
C D
SA
dc dk
da d r dk
dk d dk dk
τ σ
τ σ
=
= −
′ = − − + =
= − + + − =
 
A decrease in private finance 0Cdk <  without a change in capital in production 
0dk =  means a larger level of net external finance such that  
 
(49)       ( ) 0.D Ed k k+ >  
These results show that an excessive amount of external equity finance can be 
reinvested through corporate savings for risk sharing. In the case of business groups, 
a parent firm’s excessive external finance flows into its internal equity finance that 
is used by the subsidiary firms when they invest for risk sharing. Moreover, by 
raising more external finance, an entrepreneur can reduce wealth transferred to her 
firm, consume more, and save less. The declining savings ratio of the rich, most of 
whom are financially unconstrained business-group entrepreneurs, can result in a 
decline in the capital stock of an economy. Thus, in the model, the strictly positive 
correlation between the price of capital and aggregate capital in production of an 
economy can be broken as financial frictions decrease. 
 
VI. A Numerical Example of the Model 
  
A. Setup 
 
I construct a numerical example of the model and use it to compare two 
economies: an economy with business groups in which an entrepreneur can choose 
to create a business group and an economy without business groups in which 
building a business group is not an option for an entrepreneur. 
Table 1 summarizes the parameters used in the numerical example. A CRRA utility 
 
TABLE 1—PARAMETERS 
Description Parameter 
Time discounting factor 𝛽 = 0.85 
Relative risk aversion 𝛾 = 1.2 
Span of control 𝛼 + 𝜃 = 0.8 
Capital share 𝛼 = 0.8/3 
Labor share 𝜃 = 0.8 ∗ 2/3 
Average capital depreciation rate 𝐸𝛿ᇱ = 0.059 
Flotation costs 𝑘ி = 20 
Stand-alone firm’s equity share sold out 𝜎ௌ஺ = 0.9 
Business-group firm’s equity share sold out 𝜎஻ீ = 0.7 
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TABLE 2—THE TRANSITION PROBABILITY OF MANAGERIAL TALENT 
𝑝ିଽ 𝑝ି଼ 𝑝ି଻ 𝑝ି଺ 𝑝ିହ 𝑝ିସ 𝑝ିଷ 𝑝ିଶ 𝑝ିଵ 𝑝଴ 
0.005 0.005 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 
𝑝ାଵ 𝑝ାଶ 𝑝ାଷ 𝑝ାସ 𝑝ାହ 𝑝ା଺ 𝑝ା଻ 𝑝ା଼ 𝑝ାଽ  
0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025  
 
function is employed such that 
1 1( ) .1
cu c
γ
γ
−
−
=
−
  I choose parameters that are 
conventional in the literature with one exception, a time-discounting factor β  , 
which is intentionally set to a very low value for rapid convergence of the numerical 
calculation. Model-specific parameters such as flotation costs and maximum equity 
shares sold to outside shareholders are based on the rule of thumb.12 
The wealth space is discretized into twenty exponentially increasing grids from 
4(1) 1.0 10a −= ×  to 6(20) 1.0 10 .a = ×  The managerial talent space is discretized 
into twenty exponentially increasing grids from (1) 1z =   to (20) 4.z =   The 
transition probability of the managerial talent from ( )z z i=   to ( )z z j′ =   is 
defined as follows: {1, 2, , 19, 20}, max{1, min{20, }}i j i k∀ ∈ = +  with probability 
, { 9, 8, , 8, 9},kp k ∈ − −   in Table 2.13 
Lastly, I assume that the capital depreciation rate δ ′  is a simple random variable, 
which is independent of shocks to managerial talent such that 
 
(50)    0.8 0.05.0.02 0.95
with probability
with probability
δδ
δ
 =
′ = 
=
 
B. Observations 
 
Observation 1 (Occupational Choice). The rich choose to become business-group 
entrepreneurs. The poor but talented are hired as business-group managers with 
positive probabilities. The northwest region of ( , ),z a   where individuals with 
positive probabilities of being hired as managers reside, becomes smaller as investor 
protection improves. The poor, untalented become workers. 
 
Figure 3 shows the occupational choices of individuals given a moderate degree 
of financial frictions, 0.5.τ =  We find that the east, where the rich reside, is filled 
with business-group entrepreneurs and that the northwest, where the poor but 
talented reside, is filled with stand-alone entrepreneurs who can be hired as business- 
 
12For example, I choose 𝜎஻ீ = 0.7 because it is one of the criteria the Fair Trade Commission in South Korea 
uses to identify if a corporation is a business-group subsidiary. 
13Note that given the exponentially increasing managerial talent space, the transition probability defined in 
Table 2 mimics a scale-free growth process bounded below 𝑧ᇱ = 𝑧(1) with negative drift, which can approximate 
a stationary Pareto distribution (e.g., Gabaix, 1999). 
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FIGURE 3. OCCUPATIONAL MAP IN AN ECONOMY WITH BUSINESS GROUPS GIVEN 0.5τ =  
Note: No population exists outside the border of the orange line. 
 
group managers. This occupational policy function shows that pyramidal business 
groups work as start-up breeders that can foster productive firms given capital 
market imperfections. In the southwest, a declining line separating a SA region from 
a W region indicates that wealth is required for an individual to become a stand-alone 
entrepreneur given financial frictions. 
As the fraction of diversion decreases to 0.1,τ =  two changes are observed in 
Figure 4 below, which depicts the occupational choices of individuals in an economy 
with business groups given 0.1.τ =  First, the rich but untalented still become 
business-group entrepreneurs because they expect to earn ex-ante positive profits by 
hiring the talented as managers. We will see that these unproductive business-group 
entrepreneurs can be a source of resource misallocation. If we shut down the 
possibility of creating pyramidal business groups, the southeast region in Figure 6 
shows that the rich but untalented business-group entrepreneurs would become 
workers in an economy without business groups given 0.1.τ =  
Second, Figure 4 shows that fewer individuals are hired as business-group 
managers. Note that the managerial compensation 2 2( , )Mw z a  is likely to increase 
as financial frictions decrease because an outside option of running a stand-alone 
firm should be a better option with lower financial frictions. Thus, business-group 
entrepreneurs must hire the more talented but still financially constrained in order to 
earn positive profits. The contracted upper northwest region in Figure 4 captures this 
rising cut-off value of managerial talent, which can give business-group 
entrepreneurs positive profits with high enough managerial talent but low enough 
managerial compensation. 
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FIGURE 4. OCCUPATIONAL MAP IN AN ECONOMY WITH BUSINESS GROUPS GIVEN 0.1τ =  
Note: No population exists outside the border of the orange line. 
 
 
FIGURE 5. OCCUPATIONAL MAP IN AN ECONOMY FIGURE 6. OCCUPATIONAL MAP IN AN ECONOMY 
WITHOUT BUSINESS GROUPS GIVEN 0.5τ =   WITHOUT BUSINESS GROUPS GIVEN 0.1τ =  
Note: No population exists outside the border of the orange line. 
  
Observation 2 (The Relative Number of Business-Group Firms). The prevalence of 
business groups shows an insignificant correlation with the strength of investor 
protection as measured by (1 ).τ−  Specifically, the relative number of business-
group firms out of all corporations does not decrease with (1 ).τ−  
 
Observation 2 can be understood as a corollary of Observation 1, which states 
that the rich become business-group entrepreneurs regardless of the degree of 
financial frictions. Figure 7 below presents two interesting features about the 
prevalence of business groups. First, business-group firms cannot thrive under overly 
severe financial frictions, such as 0.7,τ ≥  because overly severe financial frictions  
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FIGURE 7. THE PREVALENCE OF BUSINESS GROUPS MEASURED BY THE RELATIVE NUMBER OF FIRMS 
 
undermine the financial advantage of a pyramidal ownership structure that leverages 
external capital markets. 
Second, although the total number of business-group firms is unvarying, the 
number of subsidiary firms decreases as financial frictions decrease. Observation 1 
already shows that the number of individuals who have a positive probability of 
being hired as managers decreases as financial frictions decrease. We will observe in 
the following observations that subsidiaries are more productive than parents and 
that this decreasing ratio of subsidiary firms can weaken the benefits of pyramidal 
business groups as start-up breeders. 
 
Observation 3 (Asymmetric Financial Frictions between Business-Group Firms and 
Stand-Alone Firms). Business-group firms have a larger ratio of capital to labor 
than stand-alone firms. The variance of the capital-to-labor ratios is smaller within 
business-group firms than within stand-alone firms. 
 
Given the Cobb-Douglas production function, the ratio of capital to labor would 
be identical for all types of firms if an economy had no financial frictions and no 
shocks to managerial talent. Thus, business-group firms’ higher mean and smaller 
variance of the capital-to-labor ratios suggest that business-group firms have better 
financial conditions than stand-alone firms. Figure 8 shows that these instances of 
asymmetric financial frictions persist and hardly vary even when investor protection 
improves. 
Figure 8 also shows that public corporations achieve capital-to-labor ratios nearly 
identical to those of business groups as τ  goes to zero. This implies that firms 
would be financially unconstrained if they could use external equity finance with 
fine investor protection. However, the asymmetric financial frictions between the 
business-group and the stand-alone firms do not wane because most standalone 
entrepreneur do not pay flotation costs Fk  and turn down the option of tapping into 
external equity markets. As indicated in Figure 7, most corporations are business-
group firms, and the relative number of public corporations using external equity 
finance decreases as τ  decreases. 
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FIGURE 8. DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE CAPITAL-TO-LABOR RATIO 
  
Then, the question is if this asymmetric financial frictions have sizable effects on 
resource allocation. The following Observation 4 provides an answer to this question. 
 
Observation 4 (Firm Size Distributions). Business-group firms have a larger mean 
and variance of employment and also have a larger mean and variance of TFP than 
stand-alone firms. 
 
Figure 9 shows that business-group firms are larger than stand-alone firms on 
average because business-group firms have not only better financial conditions 
(Figure 8) but also better managerial talent on average (Figure 10). 
Business-group firms, however, also have larger variances of employment and 
managerial talent. Given the persistence of asymmetric financial frictions, a large 
number of unproductive business-group firms can distort resource allocation in a 
stationary equilibrium. Note that the distributions of business-group firms are 
bimodal. Small, unproductive business-group firms coexist with large, productive 
business-group firms. This observation complies with the occupational choice that 
the rich but unproductive choose to become business-group entrepreneurs regardless 
of the degree of financial frictions (Figure 4). 
 
 
FIGURE 9. FIRM SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS AS MEASURED BY EMPLOYMENT 
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FIGURE 10. DISTRIBUTIONS OF MANAGERIAL TALENT (TFP) 
 
Given that pyramidal business groups have a financial advantage but also have 
more dispersed productivities, the effects of pyramidal business groups on resource 
allocation are ambiguous. Their financial advantage makes business-group firms not 
only raise more capital but also allocate more capital to low-productivity business-
group firms. Observation 5 below shows that the net effects of pyramidal business 
groups depend on the level of financial frictions, τ . 
 
Observation 5 (Factor Prices and Aggregate Inputs). As the strength of investor 
protection (1 )τ−  improves in an economy with business groups, both the rate of 
return on capital and wages increase monotonically, while both the capital stock and 
labor force increase first and then decrease. 
 
Figure 11 captures the correlations between factor prices and aggregate inputs 
with regard to the degree of financial frictions. It shows that positive correlations 
between factor prices and aggregate inputs are broken under the prevalence of 
business groups. The existence of business groups helps an economy achieve a large 
amount of aggregate input under a moderate level of financial frictions, such as 
[0.3, 0.7].τ ∈  However, a further decrease in financial frictions from 0.2τ =  
only pushes up factor prices and results in relatively less aggregate input of an 
economy. This non-monotonicity contrasts with the strictly positive correlations 
between factor prices and aggregate inputs in an economy without business groups. 
The negative correlation observed in Figure 11 derives from a decrease in savings 
of the rich. Table 3 below captures savings of the rich,14 whose wealth is in the top 
0.14% in an economy with business groups. It shows that the rich who choose to 
create business groups save less as financial frictions decrease. Their level of savings 
decreases from 0.88 to 0.53, and the share of their savings decreases from 52% to 
33%. This decrease in savings can be supported by the financial advantage of 
business-group entrepreneurs, which allows them to substitute external finance for 
 
14I choose 𝑎(13) = 398 as the criteria for the rich because the population of individuals whose wealth is 
greater than or equal to 398 hardly changes as financial frictions decrease; the population changes from 0.147% 
with 𝜏 = 0.5 to 0.136% with 0.136%. 
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 (a) (b) 
 
 
 (c) (d) 
FIGURE 11. FACTOR PRICES AND AGGREGATE INPUTS 
 
TABLE 3—SAVINGS OF THE RICH 
The Degree of Financial Frictions 0.1τ =  0.5τ =  
An Economy with Business Groups 
Savings Share of the Rich (Level) 33% (0.53) 52%(0.88) 
Population Share of the Rich 0.14% 0.15% 
An Economy without Business Groups 
Savings Share of the Rich (Level) 47% (0.93) 35% (0.52) 
Population Share of the Rich 0.21% 0.11% 
 
private finance. With the same amount of wealth, business-group entrepreneurs can 
consume more and save less by raising more external capital as financial frictions 
decrease. 
It is interesting that the savings of the rich would monotonically increase with 
investor protection if we shut down the possibility of creating business groups. In an 
economy without business groups, the savings of the rich increase from 35% to 47% 
as financial frictions decrease from 0.5τ =  to 0.1.τ =  Note that the population 
of the rich increases,15 which implies that the lower level of financial frictions help 
the talented accumulate wealth in an economy without business groups. 
 
15Given the criteria of the rich, 𝑎 ൒ 𝑎(13) = 398, the population of the rich in an economy without business 
groups increases from 0.11% with 𝜏 = 0.5 to 0.21% with 𝜏 = 0.1. 
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TABLE 4—WEALTH OF STAND-ALONE ENTREPRENEURS IN AN ECONOMY WITH BUSINESS GROUPS 
The Degree of Financial Frictions 0.1τ =  0.5τ =  
Wealth Share of SA Entrepreneurs (Level) 18% (0.46) 40% (1.04) 
Population Share of SA Entrepreneurs 5.24% 5.78% 
  
In an economy dominated by business groups, however, its stagnating population 
of the rich suggests that the poor but talented suffer from asymmetric financial 
frictions and have difficulty in accumulating wealth. Table 4 shows this possibility. 
The absolute level of stand-alone entrepreneurs’ wealth decreases from 1.04 to 0.46 
as financial frictions decrease from 0.5τ =  to 0.1,τ =  and the share of their 
wealth also decreases from 40% to 18%. Note that the population of stand-alone 
entrepreneurs scarcely changes as financial frictions decrease. This implies that the 
decrease in stand-alone entrepreneurs’ wealth derives from a decrease in their wealth 
on average, not from a decrease in their overall population. 
 
Observation 6 (Aggregate Flotation Costs). An economy with business groups 
consumes larger flotations costs than an economy without business groups. 
 
Observation 6 teaches us that creating a business group can be an efficient choice 
for an individual, but not for an economy. As shown in Figure 12, the flotation costs 
of an economy with business groups increase more rapidly than those of an economy 
without business groups. Recall that the rich but untalented create business groups 
by paying flotation costs in order to launch productive subsidiaries. Thus, 
incorporating pyramidal business groups requires larger fixed costs. The problem is 
that while more parent firms are incorporated, fewer subsidiary firms are launched 
as financial frictions decrease. 
Figure 13 shows that the aggregate flotation costs in an economy with business 
groups are sizable. The aggregate investment net of flotation costs decreases as τ  
goes to zero. This is in good agreement with the observation that as τ  goes to zero, 
the capital stock of an economy with business groups declines. 
One can ask why net investment declines despite the fact financial frictions 
decrease and the rate of return on capital continues to rise. Figure 14 gives an  
  
 
FIGURE 12. FLOATATION COSTS            FIGURE 13. INVESTMENT NET OF FLOTATION COSTS 
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FIGURE 14. INVESTMENT RATES 
 
explanation. It shows that the investment rate of an economy with business groups 
is not only larger than that of an economy without business groups but that it also 
increases monotonically. Thus, a decrease in financial frictions indeed increases the 
investment rate of an economy. The excessive flotation costs used up by business 
groups, however, overwhelm the increase in investment and result in the decrease in 
net investment used for replenishing capital depreciation in a stationary state 
equilibrium as τ  goes to zero. 
 
Observation 7 (Aggregate Output). We define the aggregate output of an economy 
as the sum of aggregate consumption and aggregate investment. The aggregate 
output of an economy with business groups thus does not monotonically increase 
with investor protection. When the level of investor protection is strong enough, such 
as (1 ) 0.8,τ− ≥  an increase in investor protection does not increase the aggregate 
output of an economy under the prevalence of business groups. 
 
Pyramidal business groups cause the aggregate output of an economy to regress 
toward a moderate level over the degree of financial frictions. Figure 15 shows that 
business groups can partially nullify the impact of financial frictions on aggregate 
output. At an early stage of development, where financial frictions are rampant, 
business groups help an economy produce larger levels of aggregate output.16 When 
the tunneling ratio τ goes to zero, however, Figure 15 shows that the aggregate output 
of an economy with business groups stagnates. 
Observation 7 rebuts the argument that the economic impact of business groups 
would spontaneously vanish if investor protection improves. The stagnating 
aggregate output rather suggests that achieving good investor protection is not 
enough to lessen the effects of business groups on an economy and that aggregate 
output may not grow without restraining the prevalence of business groups. As 
 
16Figure 15 shows that a little development of investor protection is required for business groups to help an 
economy produce more aggregate output. This arises because the internal equity finance of business groups works 
as leverage for raising capital from external markets. Excessive financial frictions can weaken the efficiency of the 
financial advantage of pyramidal business groups. 
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FIGURE 15. AGGREGATE OUTPUT 
 
argued earlier, business groups can asymmetrically benefit from an improvement of 
investor protection in the model. The stagnating aggregate output of an economy 
with business groups in Figure 15 suggests that the asymmetric financial frictions 
become sizable and that the benefits of business groups can be dominated by their 
costs when the degree of financial frictions is low enough, such as 0.2.τ ≤  
The following Observation 8 shows how sizable the asymmetric financial frictions 
between the business-group and the stand-alone firms are and why dealing with the 
pyramidal ownership structure is necessary for the development of external capital 
markets. 
 
Observation 8 (External Capital Markets). We define the size of external capital 
markets as the sum of external debt finance and external equity finance used by all 
firms such that 
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Controlling for aggregate output, the external capital markets of an economy with 
business groups are smaller than those of an economy without business groups. 
 
Figure 16 shows that the underdevelopment of external capital markets can be 
associated with the prevalence of business groups in equilibrium. However, this does 
not mean that shutting down business groups increases the sizes of external capital 
markets. External capital markets of an economy with business groups are larger 
than those of an economy without business groups given a moderate degree of 
financial frictions [0.3, 0.6],τ ∈  while they are smaller given a low degree of 
financial frictions 0.2.τ ≤ 17 It is a more precise interpretation of the result that 
 
17Note that in Figure 16, each point on a line from left to right is connected with two adjacent points of tunneling 
ratio τ ∈ ሼ0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5,0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0.01ሽ. 
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FIGURE 16. EXTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
 
business groups decrease the size of external capital used by stand-alone firms in 
equilibrium. Figure 16 shows that more than half of external capital is used by 
business groups and that the external capital used by stand-alone firms is smaller 
than that by their counterparts in an economy without business groups. 
This underdevelopment of external capital markets in an economy with business 
groups arises due to the asymmetric financial frictions between business-group firms 
and stand-alone firms in the model. Note that given the same degree of financial 
frictions, the price of capital is always higher in an economy with business groups 
than in one without business groups. The higher price of capital impairs stand-alone 
firms’ external financing. Thus, stand-alone firms, which lack internal capital 
markets, should suffer from tighter financial constraints and cannot but raise less 
external capital in an economy dominated by business groups. 
 
VII. Concluding Remarks and Future Research 
 
Financial frictions can cause resource misallocation. It is understood as one of the 
major hindrances to economic development. Although many researchers have shown 
why and to what extent financial frictions can affect an economy, few 
macroeconomic models have investigated private institutions that can arise as 
endogenous reactions against financial frictions. In this paper, I study the 
endogenous creation of pyramidal business groups and focus on the repercussions of 
their financial advantage given capital market imperfections. 
There are three main implications of the model. First, pyramidal business groups 
can be efficient private institutions if external capital markets are underdeveloped 
due to severe financial frictions. Second, the asymmetric financial frictions between 
business-group firms and stand-alone firms can create inefficiencies that impair 
stand-alone firms’ external financing in equilibrium. Third, the prevalence of 
business groups does not spontaneously shrink as investor protection improves. 
The final implication can be viewed as a limitation of this paper, in that the 
unvarying number of business-group firms in the model cannot explain why the 
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prevalence of business groups differs across developed countries. Thus, finding a 
rationale for the cross-country difference can be an interesting topic for future 
research. For instance, Kandel, Kosenko, Morck, and Yafeh (2015) argue that U.S. 
pyramidal business groups have almost disappeared because the U.S. government 
pursued specific policy measures to regulate business groups, such as the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act (1935), and the increase in inter-corporate dividend 
taxation (after 1935). We can use the model developed in this paper to conduct a 
counter-factual analysis that examines how effectively the regulations adopted in the 
U.S. can reduce the prevalence of business groups and undo the factor misallocation 
spawned by the business groups. 
Another follow-up research agenda can be to study the effects of pyramidal 
business groups on wealth inequality and socioeconomic mobility. The model 
developed in this paper suggests that the rich can entrench their wealth by building 
up pyramidal business groups, which results in a decrease in the probability of the 
poor accumulating wealth. Given the assumption that the inequality of entrepreneurial 
productivity stems from luck, business groups could be an institution that allows the 
rich to insure their wealth against their bad luck. This entrenchment of the rich 
implies that the prevalence of business groups can prevent the poor from exploiting 
their good luck in a general equilibrium. Thus, the model could be used to study how 
pyramidal business groups can change the patterns of wealth inequality and 
socioeconomic mobility. 
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